THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BRITISH DOMINION IN INDIA, COMPARED WITH THAT IN AMERICA.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BRITISH DOMINION IN INDIA, STATED; AND COMPARED WITH THAT IN AMERICA.

The domination of Britain is at this period extended over countries ſo very conſiderable and important, that it properly merits the name of empire: for, excluſive of her own domeſtic dominions, and of her many detached poſſeſſions in the different quarters of the globe, her territory on the continent of America is itſelf equal to a powerful ſtate: but

her late acquiſitions in India are ſtill more valuable; being in truth ineſtimable and above compare.

Nevertheleſs Britain ſeems to hold this Indian branch of her empire in a very different eſteem: for, by the little concern ſhe beſtows on it, we are led to imagine that ſhe regards it rather like an adventitious excreſcence, or as an encumbring burden unadviſedly taken up, from which ſhe would willingly diſengage herſelf. And, from this neglect, there is no little reaſon to apprehend, that it may be totally loſt to her, before ſhe becomes acquainted with the real worth of it.

But in order to arouſe the attention of Britain to this moſt important object, before it is too late, we have ſet about this preſent undertaking: wherein we ſhall endeavour, in the firſt place, to ſet forth the true value

value of, that one branch of the Britiſh Indian dominion, Bengal: for as to the article of dominion in the other parts of India we ſhall not here build on it. And, by this repreſentation, which ſhall be confined within the ſtricteſt bounds of truth, we doubt not to make it appear, that Bengal poſſeſſeth, in the higheſt degree, every advantage, either poſitive or negative, proper to a dependent dominion; and that it is capable of yielding to Britain, in return for a ſmall ſhare of her attention, not only more rich, but alſo more durable benefit, than all her other foreign poſſeſſions.

In a ſecond part, we ſhall enquire into the nature of that ſyſtem of government which Britain hath eſtabliſhed, or rather hath permitted to be eſtabliſhed, in Bengal: we ſhall point out the defects of that ſyſtem,

together with the ruinous conſequences that muſt unavoidably enſue therefrom. And we ſhall from thence evince the abſolute neceſſity of applying a ſpeedy remedy to thoſe defects.

To the end that the value of Bengal may appear in a ſtronger point of view, we ſhall ſtate a compariſon betwixt it, and that other branch of the Britiſh empire, America. Not that we here propoſe drawing a complete parrallel betwixt thoſe two countries, upon the principles of intrinſic and inherent worth: that could only be neceſſary, in the caſe that Britain was poſſeſſed of an abſolute and unlimited power over both, in the application of their reſources and finances: and it is plain that Britain hath no ſuch power over America. But the nature of our deſign in forming this compari-

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ſon, betwixt Bengal a ſubject leſs underſtood and America a country better known and highly eſteemed by Britain, being only to gain an occaſion thereby of more clearly illuſtrating and inculcating the worth of this Indian dominion, requires, that we ſhould aſcertain in ſome meaſure what the value of each of thoſe two countries is to Britain.

The value of a dependent dominion is to be meaſured, by the degree of benefit, which the ſovereign country doth or may reap from this dominion, in matter of acceſſion to its own proper ſtock of wealth, opulence, and power. This is the firſt and moſt immediate conſideration: but, beſides it, there are other two; which though they are of a ſecondary nature, are yet of very high import; ſuch as, ſtability of dominion; and,

and, charge or burden of maintaining poſſeſſion.

Theſe are the three principles, by which the merits of a dependent domion are to be tried: and upon them we ſhall compare Bengal with America. Firſt, with reſpect to the acceſſion made, by either of thoſe two countries, to the proper ſtock of the wealth and opulence of Britain.

The wealth and opulence of a ſovereign country may receive augmentation from her dependent dominions either obliquely, by commerce; or directly, by tribute and revenue.

With regard to commerce, if we are to conſider it on that general footing, of an intercourſe commenced, by the free and unconſtrained choice of two countries, upon the motive of mutual neceſſity and utility, which is the ſource of all commerce, and without which it cannot ſub-

ſubſiſt; we muſt perceive, that the commerce of India will ever continue to be highly advantageous to Britain; and will alſo remain ſecure to her, ſo long as ſhe can preſerve the choice of the natives free from conſtraint: but that the commerce of America will, ſo ſoon as ſhe is freed from reſtraint, not only ceaſe to be uſeful, but will even prove detrimental to Britain.

For the natural neceſſity and utility of commerce, ariſes from the difference of production in the two trading countries. And, from this cauſe, the productions of India whether of nature or art being altogether different from thoſe of Britain, it proceeds that the articles of commerce which India receives at preſent from Britain can never ceaſe to be neceſſary to India: and, through the ſame cauſe, thoſe articles which

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Britain receives from India will ever continue to be uſeful and neceſſary to Britain: of conſequence, the commercial intereſts of this dependent dominion can never poſſibly claſh with thoſe of the ſoverign; on the contrary, they muſt ever contribute highly to her benefit.

Whereas America differeth but little from Britain in either climate or ſoil: her natural productions are therefore nearly the ſame; ſo that ſhe poſſeſſeth the rough materials, of almoſt all the manufactures of Britain; and her intimate connection with the mother country, affords her the opportunity of minutely acquainting herſelf with the art of manufacturing thoſe materials. From whence it is evident, that almoſt all the articles of commerce which Amerca hath hitherto received from Britain are no farther neceſſary to her,

her, than as they are rendered ſo, by eitheir the want of hands to carry on thoſe manufactures, or by the laws of the ſovereign reſtraining her from the free exerciſe of certain arts. But the population of America proceeds with a rapid ſpeed: and that will of courſe remove the firſt impediment to her ſupplying herſelf; even the want of hands to manufacture. This population will at ſame time encreaſe the importance of America; and in proportion as this importance advances, ſo will the free exerciſe of every art extend, through the diminution of the ſovereign's reſtraining power. Here is then ſufficient ground to apprehend, that the ſeveral articles of commerce which America receives at preſent from Britain, will not only ſoon ceaſe to be neceſſary to America; but that ſhe will alſo have it in her power, and we cannot doubt her

inclination, to rival the trade of her mother country with other nations, in thoſe identical articles.

But if on the other hand it ſhall be ſaid, that the commerce of Britain with India, if it is founded on mutual neceſſity and utility, cannot depend upon dominion, and that of conſequence the benefit derived from this commerce, ought not, like that with America, to be placed to the account of dominion: we ſhall, in anſwer to this obſerve, that notwithſtanding the commerce with India is not, like that with America, an abſolute conſequence of dominion, yet dominion is now become ſo very neceſſary to the exiſtence of this Indian commerce, that Britain if ſhe was to be deſpoiled of her dominion there, would along with it be deprived of all benefit ariſing from that commerce. For it is plain, that Britain

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can at preſent, by virtue of her dominion in India, reſtrain at pleaſure any one or more of the European nations, from trading in thoſe countries where ſhe rules: for inſtance, it is by her permiſſion, that France trades in Bengal, and on the coaſt of Cormondel, the two principal manufacturing countries; and immediately on a rupture with Britain, France will be deprived of this branch of commerce. And, by the ſame rule, if Britain ſhall be deſpoiled of her dominion in thoſe countries by France, (and it is from this power that ſhe hath moſt reaſon to apprehend), the commerce of Britain will be equally ſubjected to the diſcretion of France. But Btitain indulges France with the liberty of trade in thoſe countries, during peace; for this very ſufficient reaſon, that the government of France, if ſhe is not

allowed a direct commerce thither, hath the power to totally debar her ſubjects from uſing thoſe commodities; by which means Britain would be deprived of the benefit received from her commerce: and, for this very reaſon, it might poſſibly be for the intereſt of Britain to continue that indulgence to France, in even time of war. Whereas France, if ſhe was poſſeſſed of the dominion of thoſe countries, would moſt probably find it for her intereſt, to exclude Britain from a direct commerce thither, in even time of peace: becauſe the government of Britain would, notwithſtanding ſuch excluſion, find it extremely difficult, to reſtrain her ſubjects from the uſe of thoſe commodities to which they have been ſo long accuſtomed: and France would, by this excluſion, get poſſeſſion of the re-export or carrying trade of Britain,

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in that merchandize; which is very conſiderable, and would make no ſmall addition to her navigation and naval power. But at any rate, England would, in this caſe, be excluded from trading to India, during a war with France; in which ſpace her carrying trade would be greatly weaned from her: ſo that, if we were to admit that ſhe ſhould be reſtored to this commerce on a peace with France, ſhe would reap but little benefit from importing the commodities of India for only her own conſumpt.

In this ſenſe therefore, the commerce of Britain with India, though founded on mutual utility, depends upon dominion. And the difference betwixt India and America, in this reſpect, is, that dominion will ever preſerve to Britain her commerce with India; whereas the commerce with America

America, not being the effect of free choice or of neceſſity, will moſt probably prove the cauſe, that Britain will, one day, loſe her dominion over that country.

The commerce of America ſtanding on a footing ſo extremely precarious, cannot, for this very reaſon, be brought, with propriety, into competition with that other, which is ſo much more permanent: nevertheleſs we ſhall, in purſuance of our purpoſe of illuſtration, carry on the compariſon, ſo far as the nature of the caſe will admit, betwixt the degree of acceſſion made to the wealth and opulence of Britain, by each of thoſe two countries, through commerce, and otherwiſe.

The Indian branch of commerce is of a nature ſo complicated, that if we were to judge of it by the ordinary rule, of comparing the annual account

count of exports with that of imported merchandize, it would ſeem to be rather diſadvantageous to Britain: for ſhe is ſuppoſed to export to India about only 500,000 £. in merchandize; whereas her imports from thence (excluſive of China) exceed on the firſt coſt 900,000 £. Str. beſides the profit on ſales of that exported merchandize which is uncertain, and this difference, betwixt her exported and imported merchandize, muſt neceſſarily be made good by her in ſpecie. But then, a great part of this imported Indian merchandize is re-exported from Britain to other countries, in the ſelf ſame ſtate in which ſhe received them; and the returns made to her therefrom, in ſpecie, amount to almoſt the ſum of her whole inveſtment in India. So that, by means of this re-exportation, Britain receives payment, in ſpecie, for 500,000 pounds

pounds worth of her manufactures diſpoſed of in India; and is at ſame time reimburſed of nearly the amount of ſpecie, which ſhe originally ſent to India, to complete her purchaſe there. Thus the clear ballance ariſing annually to Britain, by her commerce with India, muſt exceed 300,000 £. and, over and above that, ſhe is ſupplied with ſeveral articles, for her own conſumpt; which are ſo indiſpenſably neceſſary to her, that ſhe muſt, otherwiſe purchaſe them with ſpecie; ſuch as ſaltpetre, rawſilk, black pepper, gums, Drugs, &c*.

* It muſt be obſerved that we have here ſtated this commerce on the ancient footing, as ſuppoſing that Britain remits to India ſo much ſpecie as is requiſite to make up the difference betwixt the ſales and purchaſe of her merchandize there; though, in fact, ſhe hath, ſince the time of her acquiring dominion there, ſent little or no ſpecie thither; having made good the

But commerce is not now the only channel through which Britain deriveth wealth from India: that which ſhe receives from Bengal alone, by virtue of dominion, is far more conſiderable. For Britain doth now poſſeſs the unlimited power of impoſing, collecting, and applying the revenues of that country: and the amount of revenue received by her, doth greatly exceed the expence of government: as it appears that, in the Year 1766, there remained, after defraying every article of charge, both civil and military, a ſurplus of above 1,300,000 £. ſtr. and this ſur-

ſurpluſs of her inveſtment, out of the revenues received by her. But as the above commercial ſtatement, will make no difference in the actual amount of ballance received by Britain from that quarter, we have, for the ſake of perſpicuity, reſerved the account of revenue diſtinct and entire.

plus ſhe hath the power of appropriating to her own purpoſes. But, beſides this, there have been immenſe ſums accumulated, in Bengal alone, by individuals, ſince the time that Britain aquired *real* dominion in that country: and theſe ſums, exceeding annually, by a moderate computation, 700,000 £. have been tranſmitted to Britain; and have thus become an addition to her ſtock of wealth. So that the whole amount of what is received annually by Britain, from Bengal alone, through theſe two channels of revenue and private fortunes, is near to 2,100,000 £. ſtr. and if, to this ſum, we add that which ſhe acquires by her commerce in Indian merchandize, and which we have reckoned at 300,000 £. we ſhall find that her Indian dominion creates in the whole an augmenta-

mentation to her ſtock of wealth of about 2,400,000 £. ſtr. annually.

It muſt indeed be acknowleged that the ſums drawn at preſent from Bengal, by means of revenue and private fortunes, exceed what that country can afford to ſpare: and if continued, to the ſame amount, muſt produce impoveriſhment and ruin. But we ſhall hereafter ſhow that, under a juſt and prudent adminiſtration, Bengal is capable of yielding perpetually to Britain from her reſources, near to one million ſterling per annum: which, with the commercial ſum, will amount to one million three hundred thouſand pounds ſterling per annum*.

* It may be objected that the abovementioned ſurplus of revenue doth not come entire to Britain: but to this we anſwer, that there is ſo much ſurplus of revenue received by Britain from Bengal; and that whatever part of

As to America, we find that Britain, as both parent and ſovereign of thoſe Colonies, hath never received from them any acceſſion to her ſtock of wealth, otherwiſe than through that excluſive privilege, of ſupplying them with ſuch articles of merchandize as are neceſſary to them. We have lived to ſee this privilege, together with the benefit ariſing from it, almoſt annihilated; and we have but little reaſon to expect that it will ever be reſtored. Nevertheleſs, we ſhall ſtate our compariſon, againſt this privilege and benefit, as as if ſtill exiſting: and we ſhall likewiſe allow for it, the utmoſt value that hath ever been aſſigned to it by the moſt ſanguine compu-

it doth not arrive in Britain, is employed to defray ſuch expence as muſt otherwiſe draw ſpecie from Britain.

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tation, even one million ſterling per annum.

But Britain is all this while ſubjected to the entire expence of defending and ſupporting thoſe colonies. For it was not till of very late that Britain herſelf conſidered them as capable of defraying any part of the charge of their own defence: and then having, to this end, impoſed on them a ſmall revenue, which, had it been levied, would not have amounted to a third part of their neceſſary military eſtabliſhment, America was ſo far from ſubmitting to her authority, that ſhe poſitively declared againſt admitting Britain to the moſt diſtant participation in the diſpoſal of her finances: and expreſſed her indignation and reſentment of the bare attempt, by, that only means in her power, breaking off ſo far as was poſſi-

poſſible all commercial correſpondence with the mother country; by either denying herſelf the uſe of thoſe commodities which ſhe uſed to take off, or otherwiſe purchaſing them from the rivals and enemies of Britain. So that the mother country is ſtill neceſſitated to defend and maintain thoſe colonies at her own proper coſt: and her annual diſburſements on this ſcore exceed, in even time of peace, 400,000 £. ſtr. in time of war it muſt be proportionably encreaſed. Now the greateſt part, almoſt the whole, of this expence centers in America: of conſequence this ſum, being paid by Britain and received by America, muſt be deducted from the abovementioned ballance of trade, which we have allowed to be 1,000,000 ſterling. And thus the utmoſt extent of benefit that Britain could poſibly

poſſibly receive from America, in the moſt favourable circumſtances that can be ſuppoſed, would fall ſhort of 600,000 £. per annum*.

* It may poſſibly be alledged that we ought to join the Britiſh American, or Weſt Indian Iſlands, to the account of her dominion on that continent; becauſe this latter is ſo very neceſſary to the ſupport of the former, that without it they could not well ſubſiſt. But this ſupport doth not in any ſhape depend upon the connection of dominion: it ariſes from the mutual benefit accruing to each other by their intercourſe of commerce; and for that reaſon would ſtill continue, if Britain poſſeſſed no property in either of them. Nay, if it was not foreign to our purpoſe, we might demonſtrate that, as the ballance of trade betwixt thoſe two branches of dominion is altogether in favour of America, and as the property of the Weſt Indian iſlands is not inherent in themſelves but is entirely derived from and ever reverts to Britain, this ballance, which America draws from thoſe Iſlands, is in fact derived from Britain: and therefore ought to ſtand as a ballance againſt America, in her account with Britain. And by the ſame rule it will follow, that

So that upon ſtriking a ballance betwixt the value of thoſe two countries to Britain, on the head of acceſſion made by each to her proper ſtock of opulence and wealth, it appears, that the Indian dominion is at this preſent worth about four times as much as the American hath ever been in the very beſt times. And if we look forward, and ſuppoſe that the finances of, that one

that if it ſhall ever happen that Britain is not reimburſed, by her commerce with thoſe colonies, of the whole and entire ballance which they draw from the Weſt Indies, ſhe then becomes a loſer of ſuch part of this ballance as ſhall prove deficient; whether that part reſts and ſettles in America, or whether it is expended and laid out by her, for the commodities of other countries. However we ſhall not here dwell on this point, it being no farther neceſſary to our purpoſe, than as it may ſerve to prove, that if the value of the Weſt Indian Iſlands is to be introduced into the preſent queſtion, it muſt be in diminution of that of America.

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branch of dominion, Bengal, are reduced within equitable and permanent bounds, India will ſtill be worth to Britain about 1,300,000 £. per annum: whilſt America will, moſt probably, not indemnify Britain, for the charge of maintaining her dominion over it.

As to the acceſſion made to the power of Britain, by either the one or the other of thoſe two foreign dominions, it is far from being conſiderable. Her domeſtic ſtrength or force, in oppoſition to that of her neighbouring enemies, can receive no direct or immediate augmentation from either of them: unleſs we admit the encreaſe of her wealth, which is termed the ſinews of war, to be ſuch augmentation; and that is ſhown to be highly in favour of India. Britain cannot employ the power of her foreign dominions to

any other purpoſe, than that of aiding her to annoy or diſtreſs her enemies in ſuch of their poſſeſſions as may lay contiguous to thoſe dominions. For example ſhe, in the caſe of a war with France, deriveth aſſiſtance from her American colonies, in her attempts on the Weſt-Indian poſſeſſions of that rival. But this aſſiſtance can conſiſt in nothing more than ſome ſmall military aid; and in the convenient ſupply of proviſions and neceſſaries to her armaments employed on theſe expeditions. The firſt of which is ſo very inſignificant, that it is not worth mentioning: for Britain muſt, in ſuch enterprizes, truſt entirely to her own fleet, and almoſt entirely to her own troops. And as to the ſupplies which ſhe receives on thoſe occaſions, they are greatly more than ballanced, by the ſupport afforded,

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in time of war, by thoſe colonies, to this very enemy, in theſe identical articles, which could not be procured by this enemy any how elſe; and but for which thoſe foreign poſſeſſions muſt neceſſarily ſurrender themſelves into the hands of Britain, without almoſt the application of force. On the other hand Britain, by virtue of her dominion in India, hath it in her power, on the firſt commencement of a rupture, to deprive her rival at one blow and without trouble or expence, of all her poſſeſſions and property in that quarter, together with her commerce.

The commerce of Britain with her American colonies may be ſaid to contribute more than the Indian to the encreaſe of her navigation. But it muſt be obſerved, that we are not to confine the idea of Indian na-

vigation, to only the carriage betwixt Britain and India: we muſt include in it the re-exportation of Indian merchandize; which conſtitutes, if not a bulky, yet a valuable part of her traffic, to thoſe very colonies, as well as to other countries.

Thus far we have weighed the value of each of thoſe two countries to Britain, in the ſcale of immediate benefit derived from either of them. It now remains to compare them upon the other two principles that have been mentioned, viz. The ſtability of dominion, and charge of maintaining poſſeſſion. Two conſiderations of very great weight, which, it is imagined, have deterred Britain from embarking ſeriouſly in the buſineſs of Indian dominion. For the diſtance being ſo very great, the poſſeſſion of this dominion is repreſented as extremely pre-

precarious: or otherwiſe, that, to properly ſecure it, would demand a greater ſhare of attention and force than Britain could afford to ſpare. But we hope to make it appear, that theſe are the very circumaſtances, in which Bengal, conſidered as a dependent dominion of Britain, doth remarkably excel; we ſhall ſhow that this country is, in a moſt particular manner, exempted from thoſe dangers that render dominion precarious: and that of conſequence, a degree of force and attention altogether trivial when compared with the importance of the object, would ſerve to more completely ſecure and more intimately connect this branch of dominion to Britain, than any other that ſhe either hath or poſſibly can acquire.

For the poſſeſſion of a foreign dominion ſtands in danger, from only one

one cauſe; namely, the attempt of other powers to wreſt that dominion from the hands of the preſent proprietor: and this danger is greater or leſs in proportion to the abilities, opportunities, and diſpoſition of thoſe powers to execute ſuch purpoſe. Now the powers that are to be here dreaded muſt neceſſarily be, either the native ſubjects themſelves, or otherwiſe external enemies: and the firſt of theſe, even the native ſubjects of a conſiderable foreign dominion are, in reaſon, to be much more dreaded, than any foreign enemy: becauſe, in the firſt place, the motive of their enmity is more immediate, active, and durable, even the deſire of retrieving their liberty and independance. In the ſecond place, a domeſtic foe hath greater opportunities, and therefore greater ability, of injuring the ſovereign than

than a foreign enemy. And, in the third place, this natural paſſion for liberty, doth commonly ſtimulate the natives to call in a foreign power, to aid them in expelling their preſent maſters; whereby both theſe ſources of danger become united.

But in the caſe of Bengal there is not perhaps on this globe a country ſo peculiarly exempted from this domeſtic danger as it is: the natives of which are ſo exceeding mild, pliant, and ſubmiſſive, that this, which in a Northern clime affords the principal ground of apprehenſion is, here, not even reckoned upon. The inhabitants of Bengal have been more deſpotically governed than thoſe of any other country, yet we do not find that they ever made any attempts to reduce or reſtrain the authority of their princes, or to redreſs their own grievances by force.

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For we cannot admit the conſpiracy of Meer Jaffeir to be an attempt of this nature: the treachery of two or three individuals, tending to promote their own ambitious views by the means of foreigners, cannot be termed a ſtruggle made by the natives to recover their liberty. But the timid backwardneſs of thoſe conſpirators, on that occaſion, diſcovers how little diſpoſed theſe people are to dangerous attempts: and the ready, univerſal, and unreſerved ſubmiſſion of the whole country to the ſmall force of the Engliſh, indicates a moſt ſingular aptitude to be governed. Since that revolution, they have been ſubjected to a tyranny, ſuch as was never till then heard of; and which is in its nature the moſt exquiſitely oppreſſive, and completely deſtructive, that can be conceived; even a mercantile, joined

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to the political and military deſpotiſm, of foreigners and ſtrangers: yet the evident proſpect of ruin hath not hitherto ſerved to rouſe that people into reſiſtance.

This extraordinary implicit ſubmiſſion of the induſtrious inhabitants of a wealthy, populous, and extenſive country, is certainly the moſt valuable of all qualities proper to a dependant dominion. For to it the ſovereign owes thoſe mighty advantages ariſing, as hath been ſhown, from the the abſolute diſpoſal of the rich finances of this country; and by it he is not only ſecured from that firſt and greateſt ſource of danger to his property, even the machinations of the native ſubjects; but he likewiſe derives therefrom a certain aid againſt the attempts of external enemies.

But this valuable property of Bengal will appear more conſpicuouſly by continuing the compariſon, on this head, betwixt it and America: though in fact it will in this particular appear to be rather a contraſt. For this latter country, which was originally diſcovered and planted by Britain, hath been by her nurſed and cheriſhed for above 200 years, at a mighty expence of her wealth and ſtrength; ſo that the preſent inhabitants ſtand indebted to her for every thing they poſſeſs, for even their country, and their very being: yet no ſooner have theſe inhabitants perceived their own ſtrength ſo far formed through the indulgent care of this parent, as that her ſupport hath become ſomewhat leſs neceſſary, than they have ſet about eſtabliſhing a diſtinction of intereſt, refuſing to the mother country the moſt

moſt diſtant participation in their finances and reſources; and diſputing the moſt ſolemn orders of her government: inſomuch that the dominion of Britain over America, ſtands in much greater danger from the diſpoſition of the inhabitants themſelves, than from all her enemies.

The other ſource of danger to a foreign dominion ariſes from the attempts of external enemies: and theſe, with reſpect to Bengal, may be divided into two claſſes: namely, the native powers, adjoining to that country; and the European ſtates trading to, and poſſeſſing force in India.

As to the firſt of theſe, the native powers, they are but little formidable to Britain, provided ſhe conducts herſelf with any degree of prudence and moderation. The

climate of India, rendering the inhabitants languid effeminate and ſoft, will ever prove an effectual bar to their becoming truly warlike. For, notwithſtanding that they are not deficient in temporary courage, yet are they totally devoid of that vigour and activity, that firmneſs and perſevering obſtinacy, which is peculiar to the natives of a colder clime. Being altogether incapable of application, they can never, of themſelves, attain to any degree of diſcipline; but muſt be led, or rather driven, into it, by others, of a more maſculine diſpoſition than themſelves: and no ſooner is this compelling force withdrawn, than they relapſe into their primitive rudeneſs. Nay, even when they have acquired the exerciſe of arms, unleſs they are headed by a body of Europeans, whom they regard as a bulwark betwixt

twixt them and danger, they will never be brought to act with ſteadineſs in the field. For theſe reaſons, the warlike ability of an Indian neighbour is not to be greatly dreaded: and the ſame cauſe that prevents their becoming warlike, doth alſo render them leſs forward to hazardous enterprize: they are impreſſed with an awe and dread of the military proweſs of Europeans, it muſt therefore be a very urgent provocation, or otherwiſe a very glaring opportunity, that will induce a people thus indolent timid and impatient of fatigue to engage in war with them: and certainly it is in the power of Britain, to evade giving them ſuch occaſion: if ſhe ſhall conduct herſelf by the rules of diſcretion and of equity ſhe may not only eſcape the enmity, but conciliate the friendſhip of her Indian neigh-

neighbours. It may not be improper however to obſerve, that, if we even ſuppoſe hoſtilities from this quarter, Bengal is wonderfully ſecured againſt the invaſion of any of the neigbouring ſtates: for in the north it is barricadoed by a chain of mountains, with a very few difficult paſſes; towards the eaſt it is ſecured by impenetrable woods and many deep rivers, beſides that there is no ſtate of any conſequence on that ſide; the ſouth is bounded by the ſea, the ſhore of which is every where inacceſſible, except by the river of Bengal: ſo that the weſt is the only quarter open to the attack of an Indian enemy.

But the European nations trading to and poſſeſſing force in India are enemies far more formidable to the poſſeſſions of Britain in that quarter, than are the natives. However, of theſe

theſe, there is only Holland and France, from whom ſhe hath any reaſon to apprehend danger. And as to the firſt of theſe, ſhe is ſo much embarraſſed with the charge and defence of what ſhe hath already acquired, that there is no great probability of her moleſting Britain, unleſs a very favourable occaſion ſhould tempt her to take advantage. But France, being the natural enemy of Britain in Europe, will be ever ready to attack her in India: and the power, activity, and opportunities of this adverſary are ſuch, that it will demand the utmoſt care and vigilance of Britain to guard herſelf againſt them.

The nature of this danger from France, and the meaſures that are proper to obviate it, form a ſubject of ſuch conſequence, as requires a diſtinct and full conſideration; we

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ſhall therefore afford it a place by itſelf. Here it is ſufficient to obſerve, that as France is an enemy common to all the poſſeſſions of Britain, we cannot conſider her enmity as a danger particular to Bengal: therefore our preſent deſign only calls on us to prove that Bengall is, by the nature of its ſituation and other circumſtances, leſs acceſſible to the attempts of France, than any other branch of the Britiſh empire; and that, of conſequence, a ſmaller degree of the force and attention of Britain, will ſerve to ſecure it againſt her attack.

There is only one channel through which France, or any other European enemy, can enter Bengal: and that is by the river; which, from the ſea, to the cultivated or clear part of the country, is above 150 miles in length; full of dangerous

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ſhoals, and moſt intricate channels, with rapid tides: and the natural difficulties of this acceſs to an invading enemy may be greatly encreaſed by proper precautions. On the other hand, if this enemy ſhould chuſe to diſembark their troops at Ballaſore, in the mouth of the river, that long rout from thence to Calcutta, being through a country covered with wood, and interſected by creeks and gullies, muſt be extremely harraſſing; and, as it is altogether impaſſable by artillery, muſt afford every imaginable advantage and opportunity to an active and vigilant defendant.

Another circumſtance that contributes greatly to ſecure Bengal, as well as any other part of the Britiſh empire in India, againſt the attempts of France, or of other European nations, is the great

diſtance of thoſe countries from Europe. Now I am ſenſible that it will appear ſomewhat ſtrange to aſſign, as a circumſtance of ſecurity, that very diſtance, which is ever regarded as a certain ſource of danger to poſſeſſion; and which, with reſpect to Bengal, is the very cauſe that hath diverted the attention of Britain from that quarter. But it muſt be obſerved that, in this particular caſe, diſtance of ſituation is an exception or rather a contradiction to the general rule: though this particularity is proper, not to the dependent dominion, but to Britain as ſovereign; and to her alone. For the communication betwixt Europe and India is by ſea: and it is evident that, in proportion to the diſtance whch is to be navigated by both the belligerant powers to the intended ſcene of action, ſo will be the degree of oppor-

portunity afforded to that one of the two which exceeds in naval force and ſkill, of availing herſelf by this ſuperiority; and ſo will be the degree of riſk and danger to that other which is inferior in theſe points: now Britain is more powerful by ſea, and alſo more ſkilful, than any other European nation; therefore this diſtance is a circumſtance favourable to Britain, as ſovereign of an Indian Dominion. As to the particular effects of this diſtance, with reſpect to France, conſidered as the power contending with Britain in India, it will more properly fall under conſideration, when we come to treat of that ſubject diſtinctly. Here we have only hinted at it, for the ſake of continuing the compariſon, with the Britiſh poſſeſſions in America, on the head of ſtability and ſecurity of dominion.

Now it is well known that the whole

ſea-coaſt of Britiſh America, extending above twenty degrees in length, is open to attack. Such an extent of ſea-coaſt, every where acceſſible, muſt preſent an eaſy occaſion of enterprize, to an aſſailant of conduct and reſolution: and reduces the defendant to truſt, ſolely, to his ſuperiority of force; which muſt indeed be exceeding great, to properly ſecure this mighty tract of country from the maritime invaſion of an enemy, who will not neglect to inform herſelf of the diſpoſition of that force, and who will direct her attempt to that quarter which is leaſt guarded. And if we ſhould admit, that the naval ſuperiority of Britain may prevent France from retaining poſſeſſion of conqueſt in America; yet cannot ſhe prevent her from ravaging, deſtroying, or otherwiſe laying under conttibution,

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the rich defenceleſs Towns and country on that continent.

We have next to conſider the expence and charge of maintaining and defending each of thoſe two foreign dominions. And here it is unneceſſary to mention, that the defence of Bengal coſts Britain no pecuniary charge; for we have already obſerved, that this dominion doth not only defray the whole expence of its own government both civil and military, but likewiſe affords to the Sovereign a large ſurplus of revenue. We have therefore only to coſider what expence of her own native ſubjects, the maintenance of this foreign poſſeſſion may be ſuppoſed to occaſion to Britain, for the purpoſe of military defence, of civil government, or of commerce. As to the firſt of theſe, the military defence, we muſt here again repeat, that we have hitherto conſidered the circumſtance

ſtance of dominion in India, and the benefit accruing from it, as confined to Bengal alone, we are therefore, in the account of charge, to allow for the defence of that country only: if Britain ſhall think proper to extend her views beyond that one object, it will no doubt encreaſe the charge of defence, but it is to be ſuppoſed that it will at ſame time encreaſe the degree of benefit ariſing from dominion; for we cannot imagine that ſhe will act ſo abſurdly, as to take up and ſuſtain a dead and uſeleſs load upon her ſhoulders. The military defence of Bengal will not, on ordinary occaſions, demand a ſtanding force of above three thouſand Europeans; for this, with the aſſiſtance of the native ſubjects or ſepoys, is ſufficiont to maintain that dominion againſt any common attempt. But this force being once formed and completed, as it is ſuppoſed

poſed to be at preſent, will not call for an annual recruit of more than ſeven hundred or at moſt eight hundred men. On extraordinary occaſions, ſuch as an attack made by or apprehended from France, that ſtanding force muſt neceſſarily be augmented, though to no very conſiderable amount: beſides this augmentation is altogether tranſitory; for it will hereafter appear that the diſpute betwixt France and Britain in this country cannot be protracted, but will ever be decided in the ſpace of at moſt one year after commencement: we are not therefore to guide ourſelves, by that extraordinary addition of force which Britain may be neceſſitated to ſend out, to oppoſe the firſt onſet of France; as this can happen but once in the courſe of each war with that power: we are only to reſpect the regular annual recruit, that will be neceſſary to keep up

up this force to its proper ſtandard; which recruit will never exceed one thouſand men. But the defence of this, or any other part of Britiſh dominion in India, againſt the attack of France, will principally depend upon the naval power of Great Britain; and that force, muſt ever be proportioned to the occaſion: however it muſt be obſerved, that, provided the nation of Britain is poſſeſſed of the ſovereignty and revenue of this dominion, ſhe cannot with propriety charge to the account of Bengal, any part of her navy that may be detatched by her thither, to oppoſe a part of the navy of France in that quarter: but if the ſovereignity is veſted otherwiſe than in the nation itſelf, the caſe is greatly altered. But excluſive of the military defence, Bengal cannot poſſibly drain Britain of any conſiderable number of her ſubjects; the purpoſes

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of civil government and of commerce are the only ones beſides; and theſe can never call for above one hundred perſons: and the greater part of that ſmall number is now reſtored to her again; nay ſometimes the whole is returned with encreaſe. Therefore the total drain of ſubjects occaſioned to Britain by Bengal, for every purpoſe of her dominion there, doth not exceed in ordinary years eight hundred men; and on extraordinary occaſions it will not be more than one thouſand.

Whereas Britain is obliged to keep up in America, at her own proper coſt and charge in even time of peace, a force of eighteen regiments; which are recruited almoſt entirely from the mother country, and cannot require leſs for that purpoſe than two thouſand men annually. She is likewiſe neceſſitated to maintain there, in this ſame time of

peace, a conſiderable naval force; which is alſo recruited from the mother country. So that this article of military force, which Britain finds it neceſſary to keep up there in even time of peace, for the ſole purpoſe of preſerving the appearance of authortiy over the native ſubjects, muſt coſt her above two thouſand five hundred men: and what this expence of men may prove, in the caſe of a future war with France, is difficult to determine.

Yet this is but a ſmall part of the waſte that Britain ſuffers annually by this branch of her dominion; which is at ſame time a colony; and which, under this denomination hath been, and ſtill continues to be an immoderate drain of her ſtrength. It is not here material to determine, what the original or former emigration of Britiſh ſubjects to America, for the purpoſe of colonizing hath been;

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we are only to enquire into the preſent; which, by a very moderate computation, may be reckoned at four thouſand men annually: and theſe too are not the ſcum or ſuperfluites of her people; they are her moſt uſeful hands, being for the moſt part artiſans, or huſbandmen: and it muſt be obſerved, that few or none of theſe ever return to the mother country. Indeed this is now become a very ſerious matter to Britain, which loudly calls for her moſt ſpeedy attention; as America is of late become the drain of not only her people, but of her wealth: for the numerous and heavy taxes of Britain enhancing the expence of individuals, they, by removing to America, a country where they find no difference in climate, language, laws, religion, or cuſtoms, ſhake off the burthen of thoſe taxes; and this proves ſuch a

mighty inducement and encouragement to emigration, that we now find not only the labouring man, but the rich and wealthy removing themſelves together with their property, to America: the more theſe remove the heavier will the burthen fall upon thoſe who remain; and this will ſtill encreaſe the cauſe of emigration. But not to dwell upon this, it appears that America creates to Britain, in even time of peace, an annual expence of above ſix thouſand five hundred uſeful ſubjects: which is at leaſt eight times as much as that of Bengal.

We have now finiſhed the compariſon betwixt Bengal and America, on the three principles of, firſt, immediate benefit derived from either of thoſe countries, by Britain, in matter of acceſſion to her own proper ſtock of wealth, opulence, and power: ſecond, ſtability of dominion:

nion: and third, charge and burden of maintaining poſſeſſion.

In the courſe of this compariſon we have had occaſion to ſhow, that America is ſo far from yielding any aid to Britain from her finances or reſources, that ſhe hath abſolutely reſuſed to contribute towards ſupporting the charge of her own defence; and obliges the mother country to take that load intirely upon herſelf. Nor doth Britain derive the ſmalleſt benefit from America, otherwiſe than by commerce; which is now, through various cauſes, become not only uncertain, but in a great meaſure fruitleſs; it being difficult to determine whether it ſerves to reimburſe Britain of what ſhe expends in that country, on her military eſtabliſhment there. The genius of the Americans is illiberally ſelfiſh, and ſordidly attatched to their own intereſt; therefore Bri-

Britain, by promoting the grandeur of that country, diminiſhes her own importance, and rears up a rival to her commerce. The Americans are at the ſame time of a diſpoſition haughty and inſolent, impatient of rule, diſdaining ſubjection, and by all means affecting independance: ſo that, without reckoning upon external enemies, we find that it demands a large ſhare of the force, and almoſt the entire attention of Britain, to preſerve even the appearance of dominion over the inhabitants themſelves: but it is to be feared that, in a little time her whole force and attention will not ſuffice to render that country in any ſhape uſeful to her. In the mean time America hangs like a waſting diſeaſe on the ſtrength of Britain.

On the other hand we have ſet forth the great advantages that Britain

tain derives from her commerce with India: and we have ſpecified the mighty ſums that ſhe draws, at preſent, from that ſingle branch of Indian dominion, Bengal. Though we muſt obſerve that, in this caſe, it is altogether unneceſſary to ſpecify a ſum; becauſe, the dominion of Britain over Bengal being abſolute, unlimited, and implicit, the whole and entire reſources of that fertile, populous, and extenſive country, inhabited by an ingenious induſtrious and frugal people poſſeſſing the knowlege of arts and manufactures whereby they furniſh an active commerce ſuperior to that of moſt countries, become the property of Britain: Bengal plants and ſows, ſhe manufactures and trades, not for herſelf but for Britain: ſo that Bengal being as effectually and intimately annexed and united to Britain as if it was a part of herſelf, the dictates

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of ſound policy call upon Britain to attend as minutely to the intereſt and concerns of that country as to her own. We have likewiſe ſhown that the dominion of Britain over Bengal is ſecured, in a moſt ſingular manner, againſt the danger of either inteſtine commotion or foreign invaſion, by the remarkably mild pliant and ſubmiſſive diſpoſition of the inhabitants, as well as by the particularly advantageous ſituation of the country itſelf: inſomuch that the ſmall annual expence of eight hundred or at moſt one thouſand of her own native ſubjects may, *with proper conduct*, ſuffice to completely aſcertain the dominion of Britain over Bengal; a country, in many reſpects, equal to herſelf.

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